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ABSTRACT
In many countries holders of patents must pay an annual renewal fee in
order to keep their patents in force. This paper uses data on the proportion
of patents renewed, and the renewal fees faced by, post World War II cohorts of
patents in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, in conjunction with a model
of patent holders' renewal decisions, to estimate the returns earned from
holding patents in these countries. Since patents are often applied for at an
early stage in the innovation process, the model allows agents to be uncertain
about the sequence of returns that will be earned if the patent is kept in
force. Formally, then, the paper presents and solves a discrete choice
optimal stochastic control model, derives the implications of the model on
aggregate behaviour, and then estimates the parameters of the model from
aggregate data. The estimates enable a detailed description of the evolution
of the distribution of returns earned from holding patents over their lifespans,
and calculations of both; the annual returns earned from holding the patents
still in force (or the patent stocks) in the alternative countries, and the








In many countries holders of patents must pay an annual renewal fee in
order to keep their patents in force. If the renewal fee is not paid inany
single year, the patent is permanently cancelled. Assuming that renewal
decisions are based on economic criteria, agents will only renew theirpatents
if the value of holding those patents over an additionalyear exceeds the cost
of renewal. Observations on the proportions of different cohorts ofpatents
which are renewed at alternative ages, together with therelevant renewal fee
schedules, will, in this case, contain information on the distributionof the
values of holding patents, and on the evolution ofthis distribution function
over the lifespan of the patents. Since patent rightsare seldom marketed, this
is one of the few sources of information on the valueof patents available.
This paper presents and then estimates a model whichrecovers the distribution
of returns from holding patents at eachage over the lifespan of patents from
data on the renewal behaviour of, and the renewal feeschedules faced by, post
World War II cohorts of patents in each of the UnitedKingdom, France, and
Germany (renewal fees were not instituted in the United Statesuntil 1982).
The parameters of these distribution functionsenable a calculation of; the
value, to patent holders, of the proprietary rights createdby the patent laws;
the distribution of this valueamong patents; and the process which determines
the evolution of the value of patentsover their lifespans.
This is not the first time patent renewal data hasbeen used to estimate
parameters of the distribution of patent values. In aprevious paper (see Pakes
and Schankerinan, 19?8) intercountry differences inthe proportion of patents
renewed and in renewal fee schedules faced by cohortsof European patents were
used to estimate the rate of obsolescenceon the returns from holding patents.
The earlier paper assumed that cohorts ofpatents were endowed with a
distribution of initial current returns whichdecayed deterministically
thereafter. Methodologically, the major innovationin this paper is that it—2—
does not assume that the sequence of returns that will accrue to the patent if
it is to be kept in force are known with certainty at the time the patent is
applied for. The generalization to an uncertain sequence of returns is to allow
for the fact that agents often apply for patents at an earlystage in the
innovation process, a stage in which the agent is stillexploring alternative
opportunities for earning returns from use of the information embodied in the
patented ideas. In part early patenting arises from the incentivestructure
created by the patent system, since, if theagent does riot patent the
information available to him
,somebodyelse might. This incentive is
reinforced by the fact that the renewal fees in all countriesstudied are quite
small during the early ages of a patent's life.
A patent holder who pays the renewal fee obtainsboth; the current returns
that accrue to the patent over the comingperiod, and the option to pay the
renewal fee and maintain the patent in force in thefollowing period should he
desire to do so. An agent who acts optimally willpay the renewal fee
only if the sum of the current returns plus the value of thisoption exceeds the
renewal fee.It will be assumed that the agent values theoption at the
expected discounted value of future net returns (current returns minusrenewal
fees), taking account of the fact that an optimal policy will befollowed in
each future period, and conditional on the informationcurrently at the disposal
of the agent. Current decisions, therefore,depend on both current returns, and
on the distribution of future returns conditional on currentinformation. An
optimal sequential policy for the agent has the form ofan optimal renewal (or
stopping) rule; a rule determining whether topay the renewal at each age. The
proportion of patents who drop Out at age a are the proportion who donot
satisfy the renewal criteria at that age, but who did atage a—i. The drop Out
proportionspredicted by the model will be a function of the precise value of—3--
the vector of the model's parameters, and of the renewal fee schedules. The
data provide the actual proportion of drop outs. Roughly speaking, the estimation
problem is to find that value of the vector of the model's parameters which
makes the drop out proportions implied by the model as "close" as possible to
those we actually observe.
Formally then, this paper presents and solves a dynamic discrete choice
optimal stochastic control model, derives the implications of this model on
aggregate behaviour, and then estimates the parameters of the model from aggregate
data. Dynamic discrete choice models have appeared in the economic literature
in several contexts (see for eg. Roberts and Weitznian, 1981); and a small number
of them have actually been estimated on micro data. Miller (1982) estimates
such a model for the length of job matches, and Wolpin (1982) estimatesone for
the birth sequences of married women. All three of these models havea range of
applications and provide an extremely rich interpretation to the data. They are
each, however, based on quite different stochastic specifications (and rightly
so given the diversity of the empirical problems they deal with) and, due to the
complexity of the estimation problem, it is difficult to determine the
robustness of the conclusions to the particular stochastic assumptions chosen.
The model used here embeds a Markov assumption, an assumption that the
distribution of the next period's return conditional on current information
depends only on current returns and the parameters of the problem, in a search
model with three types of outcomes. Each year the agents performexperiments to
explore alternative ways of best exploiting their patented ideas. One possible
outcome of these experiments is that they provide no new information
,another
is that they determine that the patented ideas can never be profitably
exploited, and the third is that the experiments indicate a use which allows the
agent to increase the returns which accrue to the patent at subsequent ages.
The conditional distribution of beneficial outcomes, should theyoccur, is not—4—
assumed, a priori, to be stationary over ages. This non—stationarity is to
allow for the possibility that agents explore their most promising alternatives
first; a possibility which is distinctly favored by the data. In addition, s:ince
there is a statutory limit to patent lives (an age beyond which the agent cannot
keep the patent in force by payment of an annual fee), the model has a finite
horizon.
Given our assumptions, it is possible to obtain an explicit solution for
the renewal rule as a function of the parameters of the Markovprocess, the age
of the patent, and the renewal fee schedules. However, the model is notas
benevolent with respect to the calculation of the aggregate drop Outprobabilities.
To allow for heterogeneity, it is assumed that there is a distribution ofinitial
returns among patents. This distribution is modified over time asagents uncover
more profitable ways of exploiting their patented ideas. The distribution of
returns at each age does not have, to the best of my knowledge, an analytical
form, and, as a consequence, neither do the drop out probabilities.I therefore
resort to the simulated frequency approach, suggested by Let-man and Manski(1981),
to estimate these probabilities for different values of theparameter vector.
The assumptions of the nxDdel, together with the parameterestimates, enable
a detailed description of the evolution of the distribution of the current
returns earned from holding patents over their lifespans. This information
is used to characterize the learning process and to calculate both; theannual
returns earned from holding the patents still in force (or thepatent stocks) in
the alternative countries, and the distribution of the discountedvalues of
returns earned from holding the patents in a cohort. I consider moregeneral
aspects of the empirical results, those related to modelling the inventive
process and to the private value generated by the patent system, in the final
section of the paper.—5—
Section 1 provides an overview of the model, while Section 2 fills in the
specific details of its stochastic specification. Section 3 provides a
description of how the parameter estimates are actually obtained. The data is
described in Section 4. and Section 5 presents and interprets the parameter
estimates. Section 6, which closes the paper, provides a brief discussion of
some more general implications of the empirical results. An accompanying
appendix, which has three parts, deals with different technical points that
arise in the course of obtaining the parameter estimates.—6—
Section 1. A Description of the Model
This section provides an overview of the renewal model used in this paper.
It begins by considering the decision problem faced by an agent who holds a
patent, and ends with the likelihood function implied by our assumptions.
The agent's problem is to decide on whether to pay a renewal fee
which will keep the patent in force over the coming year. If the renewal fee is
not paid, the patent is permanently cancelled. If the renewal fee is paid and
the age of the patent is less than the statutory limit to patent lives, the
agent will face a similar problem at the beginning of the next year. If the
patent's age equals the statutory limit to patent lives, the current is the last
year the agent can keep the patent in force by payment of a renewal fee.
Agents are asssumed to maximize the expected discounted value of the net
returns from their actions, and may be uncertain about the sequence of returns
that will be earned if the patent is kept in force. This uncertainty allows for
the possibility that, at least during the early years of a patent's life, the
agent is actively exploring alternative ways to best exploit the ideas embodied
in the patent. An implication is that there is a positive probability that the
agentwill discover a use for the patented ideas which makes future returns to
patentprotection significantly higher than those being currently earned, and
this probability may induce the agent to pay the current renewal fee even if
current returns are lower than the cost of renewal.
Let Via be the expected discounted value of patent protection to the
holder of the jth patent just prior to its athl renewal. If the renewal fee is
not paid the patent lapses and va
=0.If the renewal fee is paid the agent
earns the current return to patent protection and, in addition, maintains the
option to renew and keep the patent in force at age a +1.The value of this
option to the agent equals the expected discounted value of the patent at age
a +1conditional onthe agent's current information set.Formally then,—7—
Vi,a =max{o, na —Ca+E [Via+i (1)
for all i, and a =1,...,L;where L is the statutory limit to patent lives,
r. is the Current returns to patent protection, c IS the Cost of renewal,
i,a a
is a discount factor, Q.represents the information set of the agent In the 1,a
patents ath year, and it is to be understood that zero is an absorbing state in
the stochastic process generating {V}'1 (so that if thepatent is not
renewed at any age it will not be in force thereafter). In equation (1),r
Ca + E [Via+i i,a1 is the value of holding the patent over its ath year.
If this expression is negative, the agent will allow thepatent to lapse.
To complete the description of the value function we need tospecify the
conditional distributions of future returns and costs of renewal thatare held
by the agent. Given these distributions, the solution for thesequence
IL1 isfound by starting with the terminal equation, that is v1
L
=
max{O,r.L —CL}and integrating the system in (1) backwards recursively.
Assumptions Al and A2 provide the general properties of these distribution
functions.
Al. G (r. 2. )= C(r. r. ,w)forall i and a=1, ...,L—1;where — ai,a+l i,a a i,a+li,a "g
C (r.
(. ) definesthe distribution of r. conditional on , and ai,a+li,a i,a+1
w Is a vector of known parameters.
A2. Agent's hold point expectations on the renewal fees thatwill be required
to keep the patent in force at later ages equal to the current realrenewal fees
for those ages.
These assumptions simplify the analysisconsiderably. A2 was motivated by
the fact that the renewal fee schedules are publisheddata, and though these
schedules are changed periodically, the real renewal feeat any age does not
vary much with the year the patent reaches that age. I will assume an—8—
exogenousiy given initial distribution of current returns to patent
protection [of r11] .Alassumes that the stochastic process generating
subsequent sections (i.e. generating {r. }L2) is both Markov, and invariant
over i.It should be noted that, in addition to Al and A2, the proofs of the
propositions required for our estimation technique use both the empirical fact
that all renewal fee schedules are nondecreasing in age (see section 4), and the
precise functional form of {G(' I)}' (see the next section). For an
understanding of the general characteristics of the model, however, we need only
point out two properties of this sequence of distribution functions. First the
probability that the coining year's returns will be greater than a given number
is higher the larger are current returns; or if) z, then Ga iz, w)
C (z1 z, w). forz1 z2, z cR+, and a=l,... L—l,Second, though the
solution to the agents decision problem provided in this section does require
certain restrictions on the evolution of the sequence of conditional
distributions, of G(• •),overage (see the next section), it does not
require stationarity. This non—stationarity of the stochastic process
generating {r} turns Out to be an important feature of the empirical results.
Note that Al and A2 imply that the expected value of the option to renew
the patent at age a +1depends only on current returns (r.), the parameters
of the Markov process generating future returns(g)
and the current vector
of renewal fees (ca), that is; E [V. 2 I =E[V. r. a w ],where i,a+1i,a i,a+li,a -
itis to be understood that this, and subsequent functions, depend also on the
discount factor, .Thesystem in (1) can therefore be rewritten as
V(a,r;
a
g) =max{o, B (a,r; L' g) —c8} (2)—9—
where B (a,r; a, g) =ra
+E [Va+i Ira, g} and the subscript i is
omitted for convenience; for a=l, ...,L—l,and r c R+. B(a,r) provides the
total benefits from holding the patent for an additional year (the sum of
current returns and the value of the option).
The solution to the agents decision problem follo%.s directly from the
properties of this benefit function. These properties are provided in the
following proposition, and explained immediately thereafter.
Proposition 1 (proved in Appendix 1). The value of the option, that is
B(a,r) —r,is; uniformly continuous and nondecreasirig in r, and is
nonincreasing in a, for rc R+ and a=1,...,L,
Figure 1 illustrates the form of B(a,r). Since V(a+l, r) '0with probabi-
lity one, the expected value of the option to renew is nonnegative andB(a,r) )
r (the 45 degree line); while the fact that the probability that futurereturns
will be above a given number is larger the higher are currentreturns implies
that the value of the option [the difference between B(a,r) and the 45degree
line] is nondecreasing in r. As the patentages there are less future years in
which the patent can earn returns, and renewal fees rise. Eitherof these
facts is, in general, sufficient to insure that B(a,r) —rdecreases in age.
Note that though B(a,r) is continuous in r everywhere, thereare points at which
it is not differentiable in r (see Appendix 3).
Equation (2) implies that it is in the agent's interest topay the renewal
fee if B(a,r) >Ca The following corollary of proposition 1 provides an optimal
renewal (or stopping) rule for the agent.
Corollary 1 (proved in Appendix I and illustrated in Figure 1). For eachage
there exists a unique r c [0, c], such that it isoptimal for the agent to
renew the patent if and only if r > Moreover, the sequence
—L





r rr aa+1Ca Ca+i—li-
The first sentence in this corollary provides a simple renewal criteria.
The patent ought to be renewed only if current returns aregreater than
the cutoff, r .Notethat r (c,sothat in general the difference c —ris a a a a a
positive. If ra c a' Ca) it is optimal for the agent to take a loss in
current net returns (ra —
Ca< 0) in order to maintain the option of patentpro-
tection in the future. This is one difference between amyopic model, wherein
returns decay deterministically over time and an agent would not renew unless
r > c ,andthe stochastic model. It can be shown that the difference between a a
the renewal fee and the cutoff, i.e.C —r,is nondecreasing in the current
renewal fee (c), nonincreasing in the renewal fees for laterages (C+ ,T> 0)
and, at least in the later ages, nonincreasing in age (since L is the lastyear
the patent can be kept in forcecL —rL
=0).The fact that the renewal fees
are increasing in age, while B(a,r) is decreasing, implies that the cutoffs
are nondecreasing in age. Clearly the cutoffs are functions of;age, Sag' and
or r r(a, a g) for a =l...,L.
It is now straightforward, at least conceptually, to determinethe propor-
tion of patents who drop out, that is whostop paying the renewal fee, at each
age. First note that the distribution of initial returns [which we denoteby
F1(r; w1)J, the stochastic process generating subsequent returns (Al), the
renewal fee schedules, and the renewal rule (corollary1), determine the
distribution of returns at each age, say F(r;c, w); where w' =[w',
w1'J
(that is w contains the parameters of the Markovprocess and of the initial
distribution of returns), C is a vectorconsisting of the renewal fee schedules
faced at each age, and, formally
1—F (r; c, w) = a
/ j dCa_1(XaXa_l Ig)dGa_2(Xa_i Xa_2g ..dF1(x1)
0x =(Ca,W)x r a—I a—l'- —g a—12—
for r c and a=1...,L.From corollary 1 the proportion of patents who pay
the renewal at age a is the proportion with current returns above r or
1_Fa(ra; c, w); while the proportion who drop Out at age a, say n(a; s, w), is
simply the difference between the proportions not paying the renewal fee at age
a, and those not paying the renewal fee at age a—i or
JT(a;£'w)=F(ra; c, w) —F1(r1; (4)
for a=1, ...,L.Note that a; c, w) is calculated as the difference of
quantiles on two different distribution functions. This is a result of a second
difference between the myopic and stochastic models; in the stochastic model the
distribution of r changes in a non—trivial manner over age as agents uncover
more profitable ways of using their patented ideas.
Equation (4) provides the theoretical probabilities required to calculate
the likelihood function implied by the model. In order to formulate this
likelihood function explicitly, we require a brief description of the data (section
4 provides more detail on the data set), The data contain information on
different cohorts of patents, where a cohort is defined by the year the patent was
applied for. For some of these cohorts we do not observe the patents dropping
out at later ages, and for some we do not observe those dropping out at earlier
ages (there is censoring from both the left and the right). Let the index j
distinguish between alternative cohorts, f. and 1. be the first and last ages at
which we observe the number of patents paying the renewal for cohort j, and A. =
{f.,f.+1,...,l.,l.+1},for j1,...,J. Then, for each j, the data contain: :1)
the sequence {n(a,j)}CA where ; n(f.,j) denotes the number of patents who did
J
not pay the renewal at f., n(a,j) for f. < a1. denotes the number of patents
who stopped paying the renewal at each subsequent age until (and including) 1.,
and n(l.+1 ,j) denotes the number of patents which were still in force after
1.; and, (ii) the vector of the renewal fee schedules faced by the cohort, or
c.—13—
Now consider a patent drawn randomly from a given cohort. It will either drop
Out by age f., drop Out at a subsequent age before 1.-f-i, or still be in force
after l.• Equation (4) implies that for each j the probabilities of these
mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives are given by:
(f;)
=EJit (a;c., w); it(a;c., w) for a =f,-F1,....1.;
and it(1.+l) =1— it(a;c., w), respectively. Given this definition of
{rr(a£j'j)}acA the (log) likelihood of a particular value of the parameter
J
vector conditional on the observed data, or .Q(w), is
J
£(w) = n(a,j) log it(a;c., w) (5)
j1 acA.
J
The empirical results presented in section 5 are based on maximizing this
likelihood with respect to w. Letting n. be the total number of patents in
J J
cohort j and N =zn.,the limiting (as N+oo)propertiesof the maximum likelihood
j=lJ
estimator are provided in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (proved in Appendix 2). Let u" be the maximum likelihood estimator
of u defined by the equation, £(w*) = £(w); where T is a subset of Rk con-
taining, in its interior, the true value of ,sayw0. Then, provided an iden—
tifiability and invertibility condition are met (see Appendix 2), *converges
in probability to as N +,holding{w. n/N}1 constant, and
(w* — w0) fl(O,[i° ]_1),
D
where—---÷readsconverges in distribution, ri(.,.) denotes the multivariate normal
distribution, and 1rS1 denotes the information matrix evaluated in general as—14—
a(a; w)ii(a;c.,w)
1r,sj1 acAj )r
for r,s=l, ...k;and denotes this matrix evaluated at=
Twopoints should be noted here. First the dimension in which the
properties of w approach those provided in proposition 2 is N, the sum of the
number of patents in the J cohorts, and as section 4 shows, N is unusually
large in our samples. Second, the limiting distribution of w follows from a
proposition due to Rao (1973, section 5.e.2), and the fact that the functions
n(a; c., u) [acA., j= 1,...,J]admit first order partials which are
continuous at O [since the benefit function in equation (2) is not differentiable
everywhere, this statement is not immediately obvious]. This same property
together with the consistency of the maximum likelihood estimator insure that
[i*rs], the information matrix when evaluated at w, is a consistent estimate
of [j0 ], and,as a result, [i*]1 is used to estimate the variance—covariance
r,s r,s
matrix of the parameter estimates.
To complete the specification of the model we require a detailed description
of both the Markov process generating the returns from holding a patent, and of
the distribution of initial returns. This is provided in the next section.
Section 3 explains the procedure used to obtain the maximum likelihood
estimates and the information matrix.—15—
Section 2.The Stochastic }rocess Generating and the
Distribution of Initial Returns
Equation (6), and the explanation which follows it, describe the Markov
process assumed to generate the returns from holding a patent. The conditional
distribution of ra+l is defined by
ra÷l
f
U with probability exp(—Or)
r max{ór,z} with probability
l—exp(—0r8)
(6)
where the density of z, q(z), is a two parameterexponential, that 5
—1
q8(z) =o + z)/c]
and 0a =a—1; for a1,...,L—1.
One advantage of the process specified in (6) is that ispermits an explicit
solution for the sequence {r}L1 as a function of theparameter of the
model (see the next section). This process also has thefollowing economic
interpretation. At each age agents perform experiments designed to enable them
to increase the profits from their patented ideas. These experimentscan have
one of three types of outcomes. First, they may reveal that thepatented ideas
can never be profitably exploited. This event occurs withprobability
exp(—Or), that is it occurs with smaller probability the largerare the current
returns from holding the patent; and if such an outcome does materializethe
agent does not pay a renewal fee in the following year (the zero state isan
absorbing state in the stochastic process generating current returns. which
implies that if it is drawn the agent will let the patent lapse). The second
possible outcome is that the absorbing state does notoccur, but the experiments
do not result in a use for the patented ideas which ismore profitable than the
current one. In this case current returns decay at the rate < 1 ,assteps—16--
forward by other agents in the economy gradually obsolete the returns from the
agent's ownpatent,and the agent must decide whether current returns and/or
the possibility of discovering a use which mayincreasethose returns in the
future, make it worthwhile to pay the next renewal fee. Finally, the experiments
may actually uncover a use for the patented ideas which improves upon the
returns which could have been generated with the inforniation of the previous
year (the absorbing state does not occur and z > 6ra). The extent of the
iinprovment depends on the precise realization of z. This random variable has a
two parameter exponential distribution, that is; z has probability exp(—y/o)
of being greater than zero (experiments do not necessarily lead to outcomes
which yield positive returns), and has a density which declines at the constant
rate 0a thereafter. Note that 0a =a1a. With< 1 this allows for the
possibility that the probability of uncovering a use which leads to returns
greater than a given number declines over age; or for the possibility that agents
perform their best experiments first. < 1 is also a sufficient condition for
proposition 1 of the last section.
We have now defined the stochastic process generating the distribution of
(r2',r3,...,rL) from the distribution of r1. Note that this process is a member
of a five parameter family, that is w' To complete the specifi-
cation of the model we require also a distribution of initial returns over
different patents, that is we require F1(r;w1). It is assumed that initial
returns distribute lognormally, or
log r1'°R (7)
This implies that (,aR); so that =(g(1 contains seven parameters.
Equations (6) and (7) complete the specification of the model outlined in
Section 1. The next section contains a brief description of how the maximum
* likelihoodestimate of w, that is u





Three technical problems must be solved before we can obtain w
First a method must be provided to calculate the cutoffs, or the sequence
as defined in corollary 1 ,asa function of c and w .Given
w, these cutoffs determine the drop out probabilities, or the sequence,
as defined in equation (4), which in turn determine the likelihood
of u (see equation 5). The second problem, then, is to provide a method which
calculates the drop Out probabilities correponding to particular values of w and
{r}'1.Finally, a maximization algorithm which finds that value of w that
maximizes the likelihood is required. I now consider each of these problems in
turn.
Appendix 3 develops a recursive system of analytic equations which solves
for the sequence {r =r(a;w,c)}L1,This sytem is obtained by solving for the
benefit function in an interval containing1a at eachage.' The cutoffs
corresponding to particular values of Aandc were obtained by simply substi-
tuting these values into the system defined in this appendix.
1
Briefly, this problem is first reduced to a more manageable one by
expressing B(a,r), for each age, as the sum of L—a component functions. The
component functions for age a are definite integrals of the component functions
at age a+1 where the limits of integration are determined by the value of r and
by the subsequent cutoffs (by a+T, for t=1,...,L—a). This fact leads to a
functional recursion which can be solved using Macsyma (1983; Macsyma is a
computer programme designed for symbolic mathematical manipulations) to produce
the recursive system of analytic equations for {a}. The continuity of the
benefit function together with the features of Macsyma enable a check of the
Macsyma results for possible programming errors. Finally, the solution can be
simplified further by noting that the values of the component functions,
evaluated at a' must lie between two simple functions of the parameters of
the model. These boundary functions become progressively closer together for
the later functions at each age and can, therefore, be used to form an approxi-
mation whose error must lie in an easily calculable range, The Macsyma results
for this problem were obtained by Andrew Myers and myself.—18—
One cannot, to the best of my knowledge, obtain the drop out probabilities
as analytic functions of w and a=1 As a result the simulated frequency
approach, suggested by Lerman and Manski (1981), was used to obtain estimates of
these probabilities. The simulation estimator of {TT(a; ,)}L1,say{(a; .)}L
is found by taking pseudo random draws from the distribution of initial returns
defined by equation (7) and w1, passing each through the stochastic process
defined by equation (6) andg' and calculating the proportion with r1 >
ral but 1a < ra, for a=1,...L [see the definition of rr(a;.) in equation
4] Let NSIM be the number of pseudo random draws used to evaluate the
simulated frequencies. It is well known that 1(a;.) converges almost surely, in
NSIM, to ii(a;.) and has variance equal to !T(a;.)[1—ir(a;.)}/NsIM, (a=1,...,L).
Define the pseudo likelihood of w, say £(w), to equal that value of the likelihood
function otained from substituting the simulated for the actual frequencies
* inequation (5). w was obtained by maximizing £(u) with respect to w.
The information matrix was obtained by perturbing each parameter by onepercent
*
fromw ,calculatingthe implied derivatives of the simulated frequencies, and
substituting these derivatives into the formula for the information matrix pro—
vided in proposition 2. The NSIM used in the final round of the maximization
subroutine was twenty thousand (see the next paragraph and section 5); and the
change from an NSIM of ten thousand, to an NSIM of twenty thousand, did not have
a perceptible effect on the estimates.
Evaluating the simulated frequencies at a given value of w is a computer
time intensive task; the CPU time for a given evaluation being approximately
linear in NSIM. A maximization subroutine for a problem involving simulated
frequencies should, therefore, conserve on the number of times it evaluates the
likelihood function at large NSIM. The subroutine used here varied NSIM within
2
The computer programme to perform the simulation was designed by
Bronwyn Flail and myself, and her assistance was, as always, gratefully appreciated.—19-
each run.It was developed by modifying a programme entitled ON1DIF (a quasi
Newton method for obtaining the maximum of a function of k variables available
from the National Physics Laboratory, 1983; see also Gill, Murray, and
Wright, 1981). The jth round of the subroutine was defined by an NSIM, say
NSIM(j), and a perturbation vector, say =[lw,...,tw3}.The modifications
made to QNMDIF directed it to find, with a relatively small number of function
evaluations, an w, say w, such that £.(w3) > wi+l,k),
for i=1...k. The J+1 round used as a starting value, an increased NSIM
[NSIM(j+1) > NSIM(j)J, and a perturbation vector with smaller components
(w1 < &; i=1,... ,k). The final two rounds used an NSIM of ten andtwenty
thousand, respectively, and a perturbation vector equal to one percent of the
starting value of
That completes the description of both the model and the estimation
technique. The next section describes the data set, while section 5 presents
and interprets the parameter estimates.
This maximization subroutine was developed by Dvora Ross andmyself.
Two of the modifications we made to QNMDIF turned Out to be particularly
important. First to find the gradient vector for each iteration we used the
2k function evaluations obtained from changing eachcomponent of the parameter
vector by positive and negative values of that component of the perturbation
vector. If both perturbations with respect to a parameter resulted in function
values less than the starting value for the iteration, the derivative with
respect to that parameter was set equal to zero. If not, the derivative was
set equal to that implied by the function evaluations. Second the stepsize
search was modified so that function values corresponding to small differences
in stepsize were not calculated. I am grateful to the staff of the Hebrew
University computing center for their help in allocating computer time to us.—20—
Section 4. The Data
The data used in this study were obtained directly from the patent offices
of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the U.K.) by Mark Schankerman and
myself.4Table 1 summarizes some of the characteristics of this data.
Row 1 of the table provides the first age at which a renewal fee is due, or
f. There is no information on renewals for ages less than f and the renewals at
age f reflect events that have occurred over the first f ages. In the U.K. then,
the first age at which we have information on the drop Outs resulting from
eventsthat have occurred over the previous year is a=6. Rows 2.3, and 4
provide, respectively; the last age at which a patent can be kept in force by
paymentof a mandatory renewal fee (L), the dates of application for the
cohorts studied, and the years in which renewals are observed.5In all
countries, then, we have at least partial information on the renewal
behaviour of cohorts applied for in most of the 1950's, throughout the 1960's,
and in the early 1970's. The required renewal fee schedules (see assumption2,
or A2, in section 1) were obtained in nominal domestic currency, converted to
real domestic currency using the country's own implicit G.N.P. deflator, and
then transferred into 1980 U.S. dollars using the official exchange rate in
1980. All monetary values are, therefore, in1980U.S. dollars.
Rows 5and6 illustrate an important intercountry difference in the charac-
teristics of the data.In France and the U.K. the data include all the patents
This data set will be described in more detail in apaper we are
currently writing. We are indebted to the respective patent offices for
providing us with the data and graciously answering our subsequent queries.
Post world war Germany allowed reapplication of patents previouslyapplied
for. By 1952 these were less than 1% of German applications, and thisexplains
the choice of 1952 for the starting cohort for Germany. The Frenchpatent
office only provided information on renewals between 1970 and 1981.Giventhe
values of f and L in France, this implies that the data contain partial infor-
mation on the renewal behavior of cohorts applied for between 1951 and 1979 in
that country. In light of these facts, I decided to use onlypost 1950 cohorts
for the analysis of the U.K. L was changed to 20 in 1976 inGermany, and in
1980 in the U.K., and this explains the final renewalyears for these countries.—21—
Table 1.Characteristics of the Data
Country France U.K. Germany
Characteristic
1. f 2 5 3
2.L 20 16 18
3.Application Dates of Cohorts 1951—79 1950—74 1952—72
4.First/Last year in which 1970/81 1955/78 1955/74
renewals are observed
5.Patents Studied from Cohort:
all patents Applied forApplied for Granted
6.Estimated Average Ratio of
Patents Granted to Patents .93 .83 .35 * Appliedfor
7.NPAT =N/J 36,865 37,286 21,273
*aSymbols are defined as follows: f =thefirst age at which a renewal fee is
due; L =thelast age at which an agent can keep the patent in force by payment
of an annual renewal fee; and NPAT the average number of patents per cohort.
*b
For France and the U.K. these estimates were obtained as follows. Let
be the number of patents applied for in year t, and be the number of patents
_1T 4
granted. Then the ratio was calculated as T
[(E.25n+)/n]. t=1 i=1
In Germany the ratio of the patents granted to those applied for from a given
cohort was directly available, and these ratios were simply averaged over the
cohorts studied.—22--
applied for in the cohorts specified in row 3, but in Germany the data contain
only those patents granted. Patents granted by date of application were not
available for France and the U.K. ,thougha rough estimate of the ratio of
grants to applications in these two countries can be obtained by comparing
the number of patents applied for to those granted over time (see the notes to
Table 1). This ratio was quite large in France (.93), a bit smaller in the U.K.
(.83), but only .35 in Germany (row 6). As a result of the facts that the data
contain grants in Germany (in contrast to applications in France and the U.K.),
and that the German granting criteria select Out only a relatively small portion
of the patents applied for, the average number of patents per cohort is smaller
in Germany (about 21,000) than in France or in the UK. (about 37,000; see row 7).
Note that rows 3 and 7 imply that the data contain information on about one
million patents in each of France and the U.K.,andon about half of a million
patents in Germany.
Figures 2 and 3 provide the proportion renewed, and the proportion dropping
out, by age, averaged over the cohorts for which these statistics were observed;
while figure 4 provides the mean of the renewal fee schedules used in the analysis.
Figure 1 makes it clear that there is a distinct difference between the age—path
of the proportion renewed in Germany, and those in the other two countries. This
difference is magnified in figure 2. In Germany the proportion dropping Out is
much lower in the early ages, subsequently overtakes and then stays larger than
the proportion dropping out in the other two countries. The lower drop out
probabilities in the early ages in Germany could reflect the success of the
German patent office in weeding out the patents which have high probabilities of
not being profitably developed; especially since the renewal fees in the early
ages in Germany are relatively small and comparable to those in the other countries
(see figure 4). After age five, however, these fees are increasing at a much
faster pace in Germany, and this should, all else equal, generate larger drop
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2 also illustrates that there are, in fact, substantial differences
in the proportion dropping Out both between different ages for a givencountry,
andbetween countries for a given age (the drop out proportion for age five in
the U.K. is not illustrated but equals .305). This understates the total
variance in the drop out proportions since there is variance between cohorts
at a given age in each country. Most of this latter variance is concentrated
in the early ages. Finally, note that in all countries (though to a varying
extent) the drop out probabiliites do not decline at as fast a pace in the last
few ages as in the ages immediately preceeding them. This is what we would
expect from a stochastic model of renewal behaviour, since as the age of the
patent approaches L, the option value of holding the patent goes to zero.
Turning to figure 3 note that the average cost of renewal schedules are
nondecreasing in age. This is also true for the renewal fee schedules of each
year and underlies the form of the solution to the agents decision problem
provided in Corollary 1. The renewal fees are quite small in all countries in
the early years, and increase significantly faster in Germany thereafter.—27—
Section 5. The Empirical Results
Table 2 provides the parameter estimates, different dimensions of the data,
and some summary statistics, for each country. It was decided at the outset to
set the discount factor ()equalto .9 in all runs; and the results presented
in the table are conditional on •96
The parameter estimates in Germany and France are all positive and highly
significant. Recall that the dimension in which parameter estimates converge to
their true values is the total number of patents or NPAT. The extremely large
values of NPAT (row B.2) explain the relatively low estimated standard errors in
France and Germany. On the other hand the estimated information matrix for the
U.K. was singular (see footnote b to the table). As will become clear presently,
this occurs because the estimates imply that in order to distinguish between
different possible values of the parameter vector we require independent
information on events which occur during the early ages; and in the U.K. we do
not have such information until age 6.
To get an indication of the fit of the model the difference between the
estimated and acutual it's was squared and averaged over the NCI-IRTAGE (row B.4)
distinct cohort—age cells for which these proportions are observed. The
resulting numbers appear as MSE{ir] in row C.1 of the table. Comparing them to
the variance in the actual ii's (i.e., to V[x;data} in row C.3), it is clear that
in France and Germany only a small fraction of the variance in the acutal x's is
notaccounted for by the model (1.4% in France, and .6% inGermany), while in
theU.K.this fraction is somewhat larger (6.4 %).Tosee whether there was any
indication of cohort specific differences in the fit of the model, the differences
between the estimated and actual x's were also used to calculate a pseudo
6Thisdecision, and the decision to make only one run for each country,
were taken, in part, to minimize on computer time. The CPU time for each run
increases more than proportionately to the number of parameters estimated.—28—













































(3 .7 Ox 10)
(2 .46x103)
B.DitnensionC
B.1NPAT 1,069,095 983,471 446,741
B .2NSIM 20,000 20,000 20,000
B.3Age:f/L 2/20 5/16 3/18




apatents are assigned to cohorts by year of application. Numbers in
parenthesis beside parameter estimates are their estimated standard errors.
*
bLetting[j*] be the estimated information matrix, then, for the U.K.
=0.The standard errors of this column were obtained by inverting a six by
:i: ::
consistingof i for r,s * 0. They are, therefore, conditional on
CSee also the notes to Table 1 •NPAT=thetotal number of patents covered by
the data. NSIM =thenumber of random draws used to evaluate the simulated
frequencies in the final iteration of the maximization subroutine and in the
estimation of the information matrix (see Section 4). NCHRT =numberof cohorts
covered by the data. NCHRTAGE =thenumber of cohort—age cells covered by the
data.
dLetea .bethe difference between the estimated and the actual n(a,j) for
2
acA., j=1,...,J. Then MSE [n} =(NCHRTAGE)E Ee .and
j1 acA.a,j
Jl.—1
2 2 PDW()= (e .- e.)I.E (1.-f.)]/ [EE e./.E (1 -f.+1)]. j=l af. a+1 ,j a,jjl jj 1 af a ,jjl jj
V[7l; datal is the sample variance of n(a,j).—30—
Durbin—Watson statistic for each country (see note d to Table 2). These are
provided in row C.2 of the table, and seem to distribute about two.I return to
further comments on the fit of the model after a brief description of some of
the implications of the parameter estimates; particularly those relating to the
characteristics of the learning process. Since it is these characteristics that
the data in the U.K. are not rich enough to determine, I shall concentrate on
the estimates for France and Germany.
The parameters whose estimates exhibit substantial intercountry differences
are u,°R'and a. The estimates of jiand°R imply that a substantial fraction
of the patents in the French data started out with low, almost negligible, initial
returns; while the higher mean and the lower coefficient of variation in Germany
imply that this phenomena was not nearly as pronounced among German patents (the
mode of the estimated distribution of initial returns is under ten dollars in
France but is over two hundred dollars in Germany; and the parameter estimates
indicated that about thirty percent of the French patents had initial returns
under fifty dollars, while under one percent of the German patents do). The
larger a in Germany implies that, on average, the holders of the patents
included in the German data had a higher probability of discovering uses which
increased the returns to their patented ideas. Recall that the German data
includes only patents granted while the French data includes all patents applied
for; and that the granting criteria seem to be particularly stringent in Germany
(Table 1). It seems, then, that the German patent officewas, on the whole,
successful in weeding Out patents with low initial returns and a smaller
probability of increasing those returns over time.
The estimates of 0, 6, ,andy do not vary much between the two countries.
The low estimates of 4>(about.5) implies that the learning process is
concentrated in the early ages. Table 3 illustrates this point. The descriptive—31—




E(r) [r1r1 > 0] 380.43 1608.57
Pr (Downside); Pr (Upside) .0637; .1807 .0004; .2705
it(2;, .0637 (no required renewal)
E(r) Er2r2 > 0] 1414.72 3400.98
Pr (Downside); Pr (Upside) .0387; .0331 .0006; .0584
it(3;,) .0907 .0013
E(r)Er3r3 > 0] 1432.24 3224.56
Pr (Downside);Pr (Upside) .0118; .0012 .0005; .0039
it(4;,) .0792 .0121
E(r) ft4r4 > 0] 1339.05 2899.41
Pr (Downside); Pr (Upside) .0048; 0.00 .0003; 0.0
it(5; .0381 .0277
E(r)Er5 (r5> 0] 1192.70 2641.40
NPAT 36.865 21,273—32—
NOTES TO TABLE 3
'The estimates were basedon a simulation run with 20,000 draws using the
estimates of w given in Table 2 and the mean of the renewal fee schedules.
Pr (Downside) is the average probability of discovering that the patented ideas
will never by profitably exploited (of drawing the absorbing state);averaged
over the patents still in force. Pr (Upside) is the average probability of
discovering a use which enables the agent to increase returns in the following
year (of z > 6r); averaged over the patents still in force.
E[r r > 0] =themean of r for patents still in force.
n(a; C,w)the proportion of patents who drop out at the ath renewal.—33--
statistics provided in this and in subsequent tables were obtained from a
simulation run of 20,000 draws based on the mean of the renewal fee schedules
and the parameter estimates of Table 2. Consider first the column of figures for
France. The mean of the initial distribution of returns was 380 dollars.
During the initial year just under twenty percent of the French patent holders
discovered a use which enabled them to increase subsequentreturns, while
over six percent discovered that their patented ideas could never be profitably
exploited. These six percent were the only patents whose renewal fees were not
paid in the second year. The holders of the remaining patents paid the renewal
fee and maintained the option of patent protection on the results of thesecond
year's experiments. The substantial learning that occurred over the firstyear
caused a sharp increase in the average returns of thepatents still in force in
the second year. During the second year nuch less learning occuredthan occurred
during the first year. An additional nine percent of the patent holdersstopped
paying the renewal fee at the third age. Of these, about fivepercent were owned
by agents who, after doing experiments for two years, had decided that itwas
not worthwhile to pay the renewal fee in order to have the option ofpatent
protection on the results of subsequent experiments. Average learning probabilities
decreased further over the next two ages. They were just about sufficientto
keep the mean of the current returns earned on the patents still in force
constant. There was essentially no learning after the fifthage, and the effect
of the obsolescence process clearly dominates the learningprocesses when
comparing the means of the patents still in force in the fifth, to those still in
force in the fourth, ages. The major qualitative difference betweenthe German
and the French columns in this table arises from thefact, noted earlier, that
the German parameter estimates imply that a much smallerproportion of the
patents in the German data started out with negligible returns. As a result
most of the patents included in the German data were known to be worthsomething—34--
at the outset, and more of the German patent holders who did not discover a more
profitable use over time had current returns which induced them to pay the
renewal fee until the ages in which those fees started rising sharply (which was
after age five, see figire 4)!
I now return briefly to the issue of the fit of the model. Figure 5 provides
the proportion renewed, by age, averaged over the cohorts for which this
proportion was observed. The thick lines provide the proportions in the data,
the thin lines those estimated by our model, and, for comparison, we also provide
the proportions estimated from a model which does not allow for learning,
(the broken lines). The no learning model is a model in which patents are
endowed with an initial distribution of returns which decay determiriistically
thereafter. It is obtained by changing the probability statement in equation
(6) to read; r+l with probability one.8 In this figure it is hard to
distinguish the curve estimated by the model with learning, from the data. On
the other hand the model without learning predicts too few renewals in the early
ages (i.e., too many drop Outs), too many renewals in the middle ages, and too
few again in the later ages. Recall that the renewal fees are close to constant
over the initial ages. As a result, the model without learning cannot accommodate
both the small number of drop Outs fltheinitial age, and the sharp increase
in the number of drop Outs over the next few ages. This point is magnified
The parameter estimates for the U.K. presented in Table 2 imply a learning
process which is similar to those described for France and Germany. The problem
with the U.K. estimates was that without independent information on the drop
Outs over the first few ages, the likelihood function could not distinguish
between different values for the learning parameters, particularly S and 4.Asa
result of this fact the maximization algorithm also had much more difficulty in
finding the estimates for the U.K.
8
As one would expect from the large size of our samples (NPAT) the likeli-
hood ratio test statistic for the null hypothesis that there wasnolearning was
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in figure 6 which provides the proportion dropping Out, by age, averaged over
the cohorts for which this proportion is observed. The model with learning
accounts for the combination of the low initial drop outs and the increase
in the number of drop Outs over the next few ages by estimates which imply
that the option value of patents which start out with low returns isinitially
Iigh,butthen declines rather rapidly. As will be shown presently, this model
accounts for the spread of those who do drop Out over the laterages by a
somewhat skewed distribution of initial returns, and, moreimportantly, by a
learning process which increases the skew in the distribution of returns
substantially over the next few ages.
In figure 6 we can actually see the differences between the estimates from
the model with learning, and the data. These differencesare concentrated in
the middle ages. The age—specific average drop out probabilities in theFrench
data have two local maxima (at ages three and seven). The estimates fromthe
model for France also have two local maxima (and at the same ages), butthe
model's estimates of these maxima are somewhat too high, and its estimateof the
trough between them is too low. In Germany the data provide a rather flatage
distribution of average drop out probabilities betweenages eight and eleven.
The model's estimates replace this with two local maxima anda minimum; though
neither the maxima nor the minimum are nearly as pronouncedas those estimated
for the earlier ages in France. In addition, the model's estimate ofthe
average drop out probabilities in the later ages are a bit too high in France,
and a bit too low in Germany.
The proportions which actually enter the likelihood function (then's) are
a combination of the renewal proportions (for the lastage for each cohort, and
the first where there was left censoring) and the drop outproportions (for all









































the mean square error measures provided in row C.2 of Table 2.Though figures 5
and 6 indicate why the nan square error measures are low relativeto the
variance of u in the data; they also point Out that thereare still some aspects
of the data that the model does not accountfor, and this should be kept in
mind when considering the implications of theparameter estimates.9
Figures 7 and 8 provide the distribution of current returnsat age one,
age three, and age five, in France, and in Germany,respectively. Part A of
these figures contain the first 99.5percentiles of these distributions, while
part B narrows in on the lowest 75 percentiles. Twopoints come out clearly
from the figures. First the distributions,particularly those for the later
ages, are extremely skewed. As a result it is hard todistinguish any interage
differences in the lower 75 percentiles of thedistribution from part A of the
figures.Second, there is a distinct pattern to the evolution of thesedistri-
bution functions over age. Between the first andthe third ages there is a
substantial increase in the dispersion of the distributionfunctions. This is
easiest to see in part B of the figures. Itoccurs because of two implications
of the parameter estimates. First between theseages the experiments of a
It is worth noting that the intercohort differencesin the drop out pro-
portions for a given age and country were fitquite well by the data. As noted
in section 4 most of this variancewas concentrated in the early ages. This
was also what the model predicted since the lastage at which the option value
of patents with low returns inducedpayment of renewal fees depended on the
precise age at which the renewal fees began to rise.Even given this point,
however, it is still undoubtedly the case that theextremely large values of NPAT and NSIM in table 2 imply that theMSE(n) statistics provided in that table
are too large to be rationalized in terms of binomialsampling error in the
empirical and estimated frequencies. Though thisproblem (which is called the
problem of extra binomial sampling varianceby Williams, 1982; see also the
review by Haseman and Kupper, 1979)occurs frequently when analyzing the
determinants of proportions, I do not know ofany logically consistent way of
accounting for it when the model has a sequential dimension.It is also worth
restating here the related problem noted in theintroduction; that is, the
complexity of the estimation procedure in discrete choiceoptimal stochastic
control problems such as ours makes it difficultto determine the robustness of
the conclusions to the particular distributionalassumptions made (for a
discussion of related issues, see Beckman andSinger, forthcoming). This is one
reason for examining (in some detail) theconsistency of our empirical results






















































































































































































large portion of the patent holders had enabled them to increase their returns,
and the effect of this was to thicken the tall of the distribution function and
push it to the right. On the other hand, many of the holders of patents which
had negligible initial returns, and recall that such patents were a much larger
fraction of the French data, had discovered by age three that their patented
ideas were not likely to enable them to increase their returns in the future,
and have consequently dropped out. By age three, then, the distribution developed
a mass at zero. A comparison of the percentiles for age five to those of age
three reveals the onset of the obsolescence process; that is the percentiles
from the age five distribution are below (strictly speaking, never above) the
same percentiles from the distribution at age three.
The skew in the distribution of initial returns combined with the substantial
increase in this skew over the early ages, lead to a highly skewed distribution
of realized patent values. Table 4 provides percentiles and lorenz curve
coefficients from the distribution of realized patent values; where the realized
value of a patent is defined as the discounted sum of net returns (current
returns minus renewal fees) from age one to the last age the given patent is
kept in force. Again I begin by considering the column of figures for France.
Twenty—five percent of the patents in the French data had realized values of
seventy—five dollars or less.'°These patents contributed about a half of one
percent to the total value of the patents in a cohort, while the patents in the
lower half of the distribution contributed less than two percent of the total
value of a cohort. The median of the distribution of realized values ($534)was
10
Of course some of these patents had negative (though small in absolute
value) realized values, as they were patents who paid early renewals foroptions
which did not materialize. If, for example, we had defined the realized values
as the discounted sum of net returns from age two, rather than fromage one (as
in the table), the lorenz curve coefficient corresponding top =.25would have
been negative, though close to zero.—42—
Table4. Percentiles (p1) and Lorenz Curve Coefficients (ic)
From the Distribution of Realized Patent Valuesa
Country
*
T1 (T—1) * 8




last age at which patent i was kept in force.The distribution of values was
estimated from a simulation run of 20,000 drawsusing the estimates of w provided
in Table 2 and the mean of the renewal feeschedules.
France U.K. Germany
Percent
p pl($) ic () pl($)lc (%) pl($)ic ()
.25 75.23 .544 355.55 .554 1,999.602.249
.50 533.961.8331,516.843.247 6,252.937.341












NPAT 36 ,865 37 .826 21,273—43—
less than one tenth its mean ($5,631); and the five percent of the distribution
with the highest realized values contribute about half of the total value ofa
cohort. The German distribution of realized values was somewhat less skewed
than the distribution in France; though even the German distributionwas
extremely skewed. The difference between the two distributionswas7 as might
have been expected from the fact that in Germany the data refersto grants
rather than applications, most pronounced at the lowestpercentiles. In Germany
these percentiles were non—negligible, albeit, quitesmall. Still only about
7percentof the patents inGermanyhad realized values inexcessof $5OOOO; in
France only two and a half percent had values thislarge. Given the size of the
cohorts this implies that, on average, about a thousandpatents which had
realizedvalues in excess of $50,000 were applied forannually in France, and
about fifteen hundred such patents were grantedannually in Germany.
One other point is worthy of note here. The estimate ofthe ratio of the
average realized value in a cohort of patents applied for in France, to that
value in a cohort of patents granted in Germany, is.35, which is just equal to
the average of the ratios of grants to applications in theGerman cohorts (see
table 1). The estimates seem to imply, then, that themean of the realized
values of the patents applied for in the two countrieswas similar. On the other
hand, there were a significantly larger number ofpatents applied for per year
in Germany than in France [about 60,780 inGermany, versus 36,865 in France); so
that, on average, the total value of a cohort ofpatents in Germany was larger
than the value of a French cohort.
The patent stock held in a country at a givenpoint in time consists of the
patents from the cohorts applied for over the previous Lyears which are
still in force at that time. Table 6 provides theannual net returns earned by
the patents of each age contained in a stock which isconstructed by assuming—44—
that each of the previous L cohorts began with the average number of patents per
cohorts and faced the mean of the renewal fee schedules. The entries in this
table are in thousands of 1980 U.S. dollars. The net annual returns earned from
holding the patent stocks in these countries is estimated at; .315 billion
dollars in France, .386 billion dollars in the U.K., and .512 billion dollars in
Germany. The next section considers likely implications of this, and the other
results provided in this section.—45—
Table 5. Estimates of the Annual Flow of Returns from Holding
the Patent Stocks of European Countries
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The estimates assume that all cohorts currently in force began with
NPAT patents, and faced the mean of the renewal fee schedules. The entry for
age a is calculated as (r18 —ca),where the summation extends over all
patents still in force at that age. The estimates of the distribution of
r18 (a =1,...',L)are obtained from a simulation run of 20,000 draws using
the parameter estimates of Table 2.—46—
Section6. More General Aspects of the Empirical Results
Many of the detailed implications of the parameter estimates were presented
in the last section. This final section provides a brief discussion of their
relationship to a few7 more general, issues in the economics of technological
change. I focus primarily on; the estimated characteristics of the learning
process (Table 3 and Figures 5 and 6), the estimated skew in the distribution of
the value of holding patents (Table 4),andon the estimates of the annual
returns earned from holding the patent stocks of the alternative countries (the
last row of Table 5).
To get an indication of the importance of the incentives created by the
patent laws we would like to compare the estimates provided in Table 5 to
either, the total returns that accrued to the patented ideas, or to the
expenditures that went into developing them. Neither of these two figures are
available, but the OECD (1975; Tables III and IV)doesprovide estimates of the
R & D expenditures funded by the business enterprises in these countries in 1963
(which is the inidcohort in our data). The estimates of the annual returns from
holding the patent stocks were respectively, 15.56%, 11.03%, and 13.83% of the R
& D expenditures of the business enterprises in France, the U.K. and Germany;
and the sum of these returns across countries was 13.14% of the sum of their
R & D expenditures. Since there may be returns earned as a result of patenting
per se, regardless of whether the patents were ever renewed, and since our
estimates only pertain to the returns earned by renewing (or holding) patents
already in force, the numerator of this ratio may slightly understate the annual
monetary value of the incentives created by the patent system. Moreover, the
ratio suffers from the fact that we have not netted out various balance of trade
effects (business enterprises in these countries also own patents in force
elsewhere, and foreign business enterprises own patents in force in these
countries; while not all the business sector's R & D expenditures are directed—47—
towards patentable innovations, and not all patentees are business enterprises).
The ratio does, however, suggest that the proprietary rights resulting from the
patent laws create annual returns which are non—negligible in comparison to
privately funded R & D activity.
The returns earned from holding patents may, of course, be only a small
fraction of the returns that accrue to patented ideas. Nevertheless the general
similarity between the shape of the estimated distributions of the value of
holding patents on the one hand (see Table 4) ,andcurrently available evidence
on the distribution of the values of patented ideas on the other, is quite
striking. In particular the evidence available from disaggregated case studies
indicates an extremely skewed distribution of the values of patented ideas (see
Sanders, Rossnian, and Harris, 1958; and Gabrowski and Vernon, 1983). Scherer
(1965, plo98),forexample, notes that the data provided in Sanders, Rossman,
and Harris (1958) suggests a Paraeto—Levy distribution with an infinite mean for
the distribution of profits from patented ideas; while Garbrowski and Vernon
(1983) summarize their studies on the profitability of new pharmaceutical entities
with the statement,
"In effect, these results indicate that pharmaceutical firms are heavily
dependent on obtaining an occasional 'big winner' to cover their R & D costs
and generate profits [Gabrowski and Vernon, 1983, p.11]
Larger sample econometric studies have focused on the relationship between the
number of patents applied for and alternative measures of the outputs and the
inputs into inventive activity [see the articles in Griliches (ed.), forthcoming].
Fakes, (1981) provides a detailed time—series cross—section analysis of the
reduced form relationship between patent applications, R & D expenditures,
and changes in the stock market value of firms, that allows for dynamic error
components to intercede between these variables. That article concludes—48-
that changes in the number of patents applied for by firmsarea very noisy
measure of the changes in stock market value of their R & D related output, but
that, on average, increases in patent applications are associated with large
increases in the firm's value; just what we would expect from a highly skewed
distribution of the value of patented ideas. In addition, a strong simultaneous
relationship between the factors driving R & D expenditures and those driving
patents was found; suggesting that a significant search for uses and improvements
to the patented ideas continues at least during the early years of a patent's
life.
There is an explanation of the patenting process which is at least
consistent with both the empirical results found in this paper, and with those
cited above. Patents are applied for at an early stage in the inventiveprocess,
a stage in which there is still substantial uncertainty concerning both
the returns that will be earned from holding the patents, and the returns that
will accrue to the patented ideas. Gradually the patentors uncover the true
value of their patents. Most turn out to be of little value, but the rare
"winner" justifies the investments that were made in developing them, If this
explanation captures the nature of the patenting process we would not expect to
find a very stable relationship between profits and current and past patents, or
between profits and the current and past R & D expenditures which lead to their;
except possibly for very large aggregates. For individual economic units we
would expect most increases in patents not to lead to any increase in profits,
and for there to be an occasional jump in profits which is not necessarily
preceeded by any increase in patenting. Similar statements can be made
concerning the relationship between profits and the R & D expenditures that
lead to the development of the patented ideas. Growth through discovery will
occur in spurts, and these spurts will be probabilistically related to the
Investments which preceeded them. Traditional production function approaches to—49—
obtaining estimates of either the rate of return to the investments which
produced the patents, or the determinants of the quantity of resources invested
in their development, are not likely to be very precise. Nor will they provide
much evidence on the characteristics of the distribution of possible outcomes;
features of the problem that are likely to be particularly important in
analyzing the rich set of issues determining the evolution of firm and industry
structure. An alternative, pointed Out by Nelson and Winter (1982), and Telser
(1982), is to be more careful in the econometric modelling of the inventive
process itself; employing, perhaps, controlled search processes in which investment
expenditures affect the distribution of possible outcomes.''
Disaggregated patent renewal data from over fifty national and regional
patentofficescontaining both the technical field of the patent, and the patentor,
with coverage,inmost cases, dating back at least to 1973, is currently
available from Il\TADOC (see references). A more disaggregate patent renewal
study which estimates the return to patent protection by technical field, and by
nationality and type of patentor (e.g., individuals, small business enterprises,
large corporate entities) is likely to prove extremely valuable. Issues related
to which sectors in a particular country, and which countries, derive dispropor-
tionatereturns from the patent laws lie at the heart of much of the discussion
of the social costs and benefits of alternative patent systems(see Scherer 1979
chapter 16, and the literature cited there). Moreover, a more disagrregated
study would provide information on both, differences in the characteristics of
the learning process and in the distribution of possible outcomes, and differences
in the relationship between patent statistics and alternative measures of
inventive inputs and outputs, between different industries. Policy, as well as
empirical and theoretical ana'ysis would benefit considerably from such
information.
Astep in this direction has been made by Ericson and Fakes, 1983.—50—
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Accompanying Appendix to:"Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of
Holding European Patent Stocks"
by Ariel Pakes
AFpendix 1. Proposition 1 and Corollary 1
Proposition 1. B(a,r) —ris : (i) uniformly contiriouous and nondecreasing in r;
and, (ii) nonincreasing in a; for r c R+ and a =1,..,L.
Proof: The proof of both (i) and (ii) is obtained by induction on a.I begin
with part (i) and show that the assumption that B(a + 1,r) —ris uniformly con-
tinuous and nondecreasing in r, implies that B(a,r) —ris also. Note that
equations (2) and (7) in the text imply that
B(a,r) —r= — exp(—Or)}D(a,r), (A1.1)
where D(a,r) =Q1(Sr)V(a+1,iSr) + rV(a4-1,y)dQ Now recall that a 5r a
V(a-f-1.r) =max{O, B(a+1,r) —C+1},so that the assumed continuity and
monotonicity of B(a+1 ,r) —rimplies that V(a+1 ,r) is uniformly continuous and





—V(a+l,'Sr) a+i(tSr') —Q1(r5r)}. (Al .2)
The monoticity of B(a,r) —rfollows directly from (Al.l) and the first ine-
quality in (Al.2) as they imply that
tSr'
D(a,r')—D(a,r)Q 1(6r')V(a+l ,tSr') —Q+(tSr)V(a+l ,tSr) —fV(a+1,y)dQ 1(y) a a I tSr a
Qa+i(tS1 [V(a+1 rtSr' ) —V(a+1,t5r)J > 0, (Al .3).-A2 —
Toprove uniform continuity of D(a,r) [which implies the uniform continuity
of B(a,r) —r,see (Al.1)} we must show that for every c > 0 there exists an
h(c) such that
D(a,r) —D(a,r) c provided r —rh(c), (A1.4).
From the definition of D(a,r) the second inequality in (A1..2) and the fact that
<1
D(a,r)—D(a,r) V(a+1,6r) —V(a+l,6)l, (A1.5).
Since the hypothesis of the inductive argument implies that V(a+1,r) is uni—
*
formly continuous in r, there exists an h (c) such that
V(a+1 ,ór) —V(a+1,6) c provided
f6Ir— h(c), (Al .6).
(A1.5) and (Al.6) imply (A1.4) with h(E) =(6(h*(E).
We have shown that B(a,r)r is uniformly continuous and nondecreasing in
r provided B(a+l,r) —ris. To complete the inductive argument we need only
note that B(L,r) —r=0,which is clearly uniformly continuous and
nondecreasing in r.
To prove part (ii) first assume that B(a+1,r) —r)B(a+2,r)—rand note
that this implies that
B(a,r) —r=
R V(a+l,y)dG÷1(ylr) R fV(a+2,y)dG1(ylr)
R V(a+2,y)dC2(y r) B(a+1,r) —r,
where; the first inequality follows from the fact that, sincec+2 >C+1
B(a+2,r)B(a+l,r) implies V(a+2,r)V(a+l,r); and the second inequality
follows from the monoticity of V(a+l,r) in r and the fact that
G2 (y1 '2 >G8+1(y1y2) for all y1,y2 c R [see equation (7)). We have
shownthat ifB(a+l ,r) —rB(a+2 ,r) —rthen B(a ,r) —r> B(a+l,r) —r.To







Corollary1: For each age there exists a unique r [Otcal such that it is
optimal to renew the patent if and only if ra > r. Moreover, the sequence
—L
{ra}a.lis nondecreasing in a.
Proof: Recall that V(a,r) =maxO,B(a,r)—ca},and note that B(a,O) =0,
while B(a,c) >CaThefact that B(a,r) —
Cahasa unique zero at an
rc[o,c] now follows directly from part (1) of proposition 1 as it implies that
B(a,r) is continuous and strictly increasing in r.Since B() is nonincreasing
in a, B(a,r+1)B(a+1r÷1) C÷1Ca =B(a,ra),for all a. The second
statement in the corollary follows from this inequality and the fact the B(a,r)
is nondecreasing in r, for rc R+ and a1...L.—A4 —
Appendix2. Properties of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator
The properties of the maximum likelihood estimator used in the text are
stated in proposition 2. This proposition follows directly from a theorem due
to Rao [1973, section 5.e.2] provided the following regularity conditions are
satisfied:
A. The functions i(a;c, w) [a c A.; j 1, ... , J}admit first order partials
which are Continuous at w =w0.
B. For every w c T, such that w n(a; c., w) (a; cw°) for at least
one couple (a, j) [a E A.; j =1,...,JI.
C. The information matrix, [iJ
,isnon—singular at w =
Asnoted in the text, the benefit function from the model of sectionone
[equation (2)] has points with discontinuous first partials. Asa result it is
not immediately obvious that condition A is satisfied, and a formalproof of
1 this condition is provided below.Given this proof, I simply assume conditions
B and C. They will be satisfied provided there is sufficient variationin the
cost schedules and the ages covered by the data.
Proof of Condition A. From the definition of ii[equation 5Jand Bayes Law
Pr {r ,r > } = Pr{r ' jr > }[i — ri a a a a—I a—i a a a—i a—i a—i
i <a
(A2.1)
for a1, ...,L;where the index j has been omitted for convenience, and it is
understood both that; r =E 'it =0,so that 'it=Pr{r r > o}; and 0 <i—i 1 1 10
that all functions depend also on w. The proof of thecontinuity of the first
To see why condition A can be satisfied despite the fact thatB(a,r) is
not differentiable everywhere, note that thesequence {(a;ç,cj)}1 depends on
the benefit function only through the cutoffs (seeequation 5); i.e. through the
solution ra=r(a,ca,w) to the equations B(a,ra;ca,)—Ca 0 for a=I ,...,L.
Though not differentiable in r everywhere, B(a,r) is differentiable inr in an
interval containing ra; see equations A3.2 and A3.3 ofAppendix 3 (this is also
illustrated in Figure 1 of section 1).—A5 —
partialsof na( is by induction on a. The first step of the inductive argu—
inert is to show that n(w) has continuous first partials with respect to w at w
=w°provided ir1(c), ,.., n1(w)do. The second step is to show that 111(w)has
continuous first partials at w = Equation(A2.l) makes it clear that if we
establish that each element of the sequence {Pr (r rr > )}Lhas a a a—Ia—I a1
continuous first partials with respect to w at w = wewill have completed
both steps of the inductive argument.
Let =Pr{r =Ur1 =z},and2a(2 =Pr{o < ra a ral =z}
for a =1,•..L.Then, from the definition of F1(.) in equation (3), and
equation (6)
Pr {r ral > a-1 a1)dF1(z) +J)2(Z)dF1(z) (A2.2)
where it is understood that the point r1 is excluded from the limit of
integration, for a=1, ...,L.Lemma 1 below shows that {r(w)}11 admit con-
tinuous first partials at w°; while lemma 2 shows that Fai(Z) has a density
which is both continuous in z at zra_i(°), and admits continuous first
partials with respect to w at w0 everywhere for z c a—1' Thus,to
prove the desired result, it suffices to show that p()and are both
Continuous in z at zrai(ci°), and have continuous first partials with respect
to w at w = almosteverywhere with respect to the Lebesgue measure (a.e.)
for z c (r1, ).Since
ip1(z)exp (—Oz), it obviously satisfies these
conditions. Equation (6) implies that
f
0 if z > tS
(z) =
1[1 —exp(—Oz)JQ1(r) if 0 < a iS
for a2, ..., L.Note that r1(w°) < r(w°)/tS° (from corollary I and the fact
that 6<1). Clearly then 412(2) is both continuous in z at z =ral0), and has
continuous first partials with respect toat ww° everywhere except at the
point z =r(w°) /50which is a set of Lebesgue measure zero (for a =1,...,L).—A 6—
Lemma 1. Each element of the sequence of functions {r(w)}L1 admits first par—
tials which are continuous at w =w0.
Proof. The proof is by (this time backwards) induction on a. SincerLcL,
the initial condition of the inductive argument is satisfied trivially, and it
suffices to show that r(w) admits continuous first partials with respect to
watw =w0 provided'a+r&[T=1,2, ....L—a}do. Corollary 1 and equation (6)
imply that r() is defined by the implicit function
=a+ [1-exp(O )JJV1(z)dQ (z) -Ca
= (A2.3)
a+1
Clearly u()possessesa continuous, strictly positive, partial derivative with
respect to r. The implicit function theorem therefore implies the lemma pro-
vided p(') admits continuous first partials with respect tow at ww0. The
hypothesis of the inductive argument implies that r1(w) has continuous first
partials; and Q(z) is an exponential distribution which has a density which
possesses continuous first partials with respect to w everywhere for z c R+. It
will, therefore, suffice to show that V+i(z) has continuous first partials with
respect tow at w= w0a.e. for z e (r+1, a'),providedthat a+T [for
T=1 ,...L—a]has continuous first partials at w =w0.Asecondinductive
argument suffices to prove this point.
First, assume Va+2(Z) has continuous first partials with respect to w a.e.
for z(1a+2 c)providedthat r+(w)[T=2. ...,L—a}have continuous first
partials at w =w0.To see that this Implies that V+1(.) has the required
properties, note that
v11(z) =z-c1+ [1 —exp(—Oz)J5\'a+2(5)dQa+l(5)





v21(z)ZCa+l + [1_exp(_Oz)]Qa+i(óz)Va+2(z) +5V2(s)dQ÷1(s)}
if z C (5 r+2, o).Civer the hypothesis of the inductive argument, it is clear that v'+i(z) has
continuous first partials with respect tow at w =w0for every z c [r+i, .
Forz £ (6'r÷2, )thepoints of discontinuity of the first partials of
v2+1(z) are the points of discontinuity of the first partials V+2(1z). Thus,
if S÷1[S÷2] is the set of points in (r1, ')
'a+2'°° where Va+i(Z)
[V+2(Z)l has discontinuous first partials with respect to w at w =Othen
m(S1) < ni(S) + m(ra+26 o) =rn(S2)
=0,
where m(.) provide the Lebesgue measure of alternative sets, and the last
equality follows from the hypothesis of the inductive argument.
Thus V+i(Z) has continuous first partials with respect to w at w =a.e.
for z c a+1' provided V+2(.) has the required property. To complete the
inductive argument then, we need only note that VL(z) =max0,z
—
cL}a func-
tion that has continuous first partials at= Oeverywhere for z c (rL =
Lemma2. Fa(Z) has a density which is both continuous in z at z =r(w°)and
admits continuous first partials with respect to w at w =weverywhere for
z C (r, c)(anda =1,...,L).
Proof. The proof is by forward induction on a. First assume F1(.) has a
density with the required properties and denote that density by f1(.). Then
equation (6) and corollary 1 imply that




[1 —exp(—Os)]Q1(z), if > s > r81
Pr{z > ra' = (A2.6)
0 ,ifs > 1z,—A8 —
andOai(z) denotes the exponential distribution evaluated at z. Substituting
(A2.6) into (A2.5) we have
—1
— 6z
Pr{z >r r} =a—i1'
—
exp(—Os)}f81(s)ds. (A2.7)
The density, fa(z) for z c (r, ),canbe derived directly by differentiation
of (A2.7). The fact that it Is Continuous fl z at z =r(w°)and possesses
continuousfirst partials with respect to w at w =w0everywhere for zE(r, oo)
followsfrom the same properties of; the exponential distribution and its
density, of f1(z) everywhere for z c [r/Oco)[whichfollows from the
hypothesis of the inductive argument sincer / > r1 from Corollary 1]
and from the continuity of the first partial of r1(w) at w =w0[lemma 1].
To complete the inductive argument then we need only show that F2(z) has a
density with continuous first partials at w =w0everywhere for z(r2, .
Thisfollows from the same argument used above (substituting a =2)and the fact
that f1(z) is the density of the lognormal distribution [equation (7)] which
clearly has continuous first partials with respect to o at w =w0everywhere for
ze RtAppendix 3. A Solution for the Sequence {r}L1
I begin by outlining the form of the solution used here. To findral =
r(a—1;c, w) we require properties of the function E[V .Themodel
[equations (2) and (6) and assumptions Al and A2] implies that the distribution
of V conditional on can be written as
a a—i






+g [rnax(6r ,z)J} a a—i
where Pr {zy} =Q(y),and g(y) =E[V1y].
Itfollows from corollary 1 that ifra theagent will let the patent
lapse, and V0. Nowconsider a patent with r1 aWithprobability
exp(—0r81), r 0. Withprobability fl_exP(_eraJ,thecurrent return the
patent wouldearn were it to be renewed is max(6r,z).If z 'a'
then
niax(t5r ,z)(r,andV 0.If z > r ,thenmax(5r ,z)=zand V = a—i a a a a—i a









whereh°is independent of r
a—i a—i
Substituting (A3.2) into equation (2),
Vaj(ra_iral, ral
=max{0,ra_i —Ca_i+ 8{1—e(-er8_1)Jh1} (A3.3)
Now note from corollary I that ral 'ra< 1ra. Clearly then (A3.3) implies
that is the unique solution to,
ral —Ca_i+ [l—exp(—e 1)}h01=0 (A3.4)—AiO—
for a = 1, ...,L.Equation A3.4 provides a solution for {r}L1 in terms of
{hO}L .BelowI find functions B' ()and (•) such that a a=i a+i a+1
L—a—1 L—a—2
h0= Bv+i(ri, w) +Uvl(ri, w)h01 (A3.5)
v=O v=O
for a=l, ..., L—i (h = 0). Together (A3.4) and (A3.5) provide asystem of
2L—l equations which can be solved recursively for {r}L1.
To solve for h0 we require E[V r I for r c R+. We now introduce a a a+1a a
sequence of elementary functions which are used to construct EEVa+i re]. To
begin partition R into the L—a+l intervals, {iP}; where i0 =
(0, &+i}; I = _(P+1)a+p+i]r for p=i, ...L—a-i;and
°).Fromcorollary 1, E[V1 r, r ral = 0; while from equation
(A3.2), E[V÷1 r, ra < ra c I] = [l_exp(_Ora)}h. To complete the specification
of the function E[V r I , define a+1a
h(ra) = El_exp(_era)Y'{E[Va÷i ra, r 1J —E[V1r, r c I ]}
forv—i,..., L—a; so that
p
r, ra c IJ [1_exp(_Ora)][ Zh'7 (r)J (A3!6)
v=O
for p=l , ...,L—a, and a1 , ... , L—1. These equations and the definition of
Va(ra) [equation (2)1 imply the graph of V(r) provided in Figure A3. This
graph is now used to illustrate how the sequence {hV can be derived
from the sequence {h"(.)}0. The functional recursion that results from this
derivation uniquely determines the sequences {h"(.)}' for a=i,... L—1. The
first element of each of these sequences is them used in conjunction with (A3.4)
to solve for {_ }Laa=i-Al 1-
Figure A3: Graph of V(r)
r—c r—c r—c r—c a a a a a a a a





— l —2-- —(ci—l)— —— r 6 r 6r 6 r 6r 6 r a a+l a+2 a+(o—l) a+q a+q+l
Er Ia—Al 2—
Recall that V (r ) =max{0,r —c +E[Vr}}. Consider a—i a—i a—I a—i a a—i
first the case in which r < r 10 .Inthis case the agent will let the a—i a—I a—i
patent lapse in the next period if either the absorbing state is drawn or if z Z
Thus the only states in which Va > 0 are those in which the absorbing
state does not occur and z > r •Foreach such state one obtains V (r =z) by
substituting z for ra in Figur: A3. To obtain E[V rail ra_i < r1 i°J we
simply intergrate these values over their measure, or
E[V r1, ia-i < r e Iü} =[i_exp(_Oraj)][j(z_ca)dQa(z)
L-a




which defines h° •Tofind h1 () in terms of {hv(.)}Lconsider a—i a—i av0
Ely r r c I ] ,andrecall that if r e 1' then tSr c aa—ia—i a—i a—i a—i a—i
(r ,6 } •Ifthe absorbing state does not occur and z < tSr then a a+i a—I
V (r ) =V(r =tSr C TO); while if the absorbing state does not occur and a a a a a—i a
z ) tSr81, Va(ra) =Va(r=z).Taking these values of V8(.) from the graph and
integrating them over their measure






• v r V where here, and in the discussion below, H(x) =5 l[1—exp(—ez)]h(z)}dQ (z).
tSVr÷
a a







Finally, following an analogous procedure for v=1,...,L—a--l,we have
h'(r1) 0a(6ra—i)__0a_i)1(a_i) —H'(r1). (A3.9)
Noting that fzdQ(z) =[y+ °ahE1Qa(l? and that —c = a a
_h[1—exp(—Or)J. the system defined by (A3.7), (A3.8), and (A3.9)can be
simplified to read
L— a—i
h° =B°+ U°h°+ HV(x) (a) a a-fl a-fl a-fl a-fl v=1
h11(z) =b1÷1(z)+ u1÷(z) h°2 (b) (A3.JO)
and h"1(z) =8Q82z)[1—Oz}h'j
(5z) —R'(Sz), (c)
where B1 =°a+lEQa+i(ra+i)l; U1 =B1OOr)I(1+jO);








L—a—i; and a=i, •••,L—l.
Direct substitution shows that the system in (A3.i0)provides a solution
for the sequence {hO}L1 of the form given in (A3.5). Even formoderate L,
viL—a—l v L—a—2 however, solving for the sequences {Bj0 (for a=1,...,L—1)and {U0
(for a1, ...,L—2)manually would be both a painstaking and an error—prone task.
One advantage of the form given by (A3.10) is that itcan be programnd into
Macsyma (1983; Macsyma is a computer program designed for symbolic mathematical
manipulations) which will (with some prodding) produce the exact form of the
required coefficients.1 The properties of the model [in particular thecon-
tinuity of the value function, see proposition 1] together with the features of
The macsyma solution was obtained by Andrew Myers andmyself. We are gra-
teful to the Mathlab Group at the MIT Laboratory forComuputer Science for pro-
viding us with free access to Macsyma, and for guiding us through Out initial
queries. The Mathlab Group is supported, in part, by the U.S.Energy Research
and Development Administration under Contract No. E(11—1)3070, and by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration under Grant No. NSG1323.-A14-
Macsyma [its ability to distinguish an argzero of a function] allow a check of
the Macsyma solution for possible programming errors. Finally, for largeL, it
is not necessary to solve for all of the coefficients {B"} and {U"}. This is
the second advantage of writing the solution in the for-tn of (A3.1O). It follows
from the fact that for each (v, a) there exist easily calculable functions of
the parameters of the model (B', V) and (U", uv), such that B' ( ByBy and —aa —a a —a a a
v v U U ( U •These boundary functions allow one to form the approximations = —a a a a
+ B) and = 1/2 (i+1); each of which have a maximum possibleapproxima-
tion error equal to the value of the approximation itself. Both these functions
decline monotonically (and rather rapidly) in v; and have zero limits as
(which implies that L+°°).I now derive the boundary functions, and consider
their limiting rates of convergence. The researcher can use the exactapproxi-
mations to calculate where the approximation error is within tolerable limits
for the problem at hand.
Note first that (A3.1O) and the fact that h'+÷j(Z) is nonnegative and
nondecreasing in z for zc[ r ,°),implies that h+R+1(1Sz) is nonnegative
and nondecreasing in z for zE[ Vr , °). This fact allows us to show that
V 1
8H+i() is bounded by two simple functionals ha+v() The upper bound is found
bynoting that (A3.lOc) implies that
h"1(z) < 8h"(5z)<< vlhl(5v_lZ)
forzc[61r+1+,o). Substituting this inequality into the definition of
< 8'fh(1z)dQ1(z), A(3.11).
6 r+1+—Al 5—
To obtain the lower bound note that the monotonicity of hv(.) and the
definition of H+2(.) imply that
H1(6z) < e[l-exp(-6Oz)]h(6z){Q2(6z) Qa+2vra+l+v)}
for zc[6 °•Substitutingthis inequality into (A3.lOc), noting
that for zE [6 Vr co), [1 —exp(—O5z)]> [1 —exp(e6V+la+v+i}
and repeating these operations recursively,
hV (z) > v—i, h1 (6V_lz) (A3.12) a+1— v,aa+v
v—i
-.v+J-
—v+J- whereKva ji [1—exr(—86r81)] a+i+j r14.), for v'l,...L—a—l,
and zc[6"ra+i+vøo). Substituting (A3.12) into the definition of 8R"4()we
have,





AV1+ Uv÷1 h01 < :+:+ h°1 (A3.14)
where;
A:+1= v6vcy[iO(6_v_r )][(6/)V a+v+ia+v+i)]/[1+ (6/)VJ;
V —V V —v A KA ;U U;and —a+lv,a a+i—a+i v,a a+i
:÷=V+l6Voa+i[l_Qa+l(ó_va+v+i)18exp(_Oa+v+l){E(6k)v
+(l+06v0)Q()1/(J÷06v0)(166v0÷ (5/)V}
and 4 =c1/o,for v=1 •...,L—a—1;and a=i ,...,L—l.
Recall that we are considering approximations for thesequences {A"+1}
and {uV1}ofthe form +i =1/2(A1 ÷.:+} and {u'T1l/2(UV—Al 6—
Clearly the resulting approximation errors will be less than the values of the
sequences themselves and these can be obtained directly from (A3.14). To
consider their limiting properties as (which implies L-*cc) recall that < 1
and assume that the nondecreasirig sequence {c}1 has limitequal
to[this implies that lim(a+) r C]. Then A3.14 implies that,
for each age, both sequences {Av+l} and {Uv÷i}o converge to zero at the
limiting rate exp(—5 c/Y+i)• Since the lower bounds, and
decline faster then the upper bounds, so does the approximationerror.
The following procedure was used to obtain the resultsreported in this
paper. For each (relevant) age an exact calculation of the first four elements
v iL—a—i r V iL—a—2 for both sequences
and lTJa+iIv..0 was made using (A3.lO). After
checking that using the approximation for the fourth element instead of its
exact value did not have a perceptible effect on the cutoffs, that and
subsequent elements were replaced by the approximations for them.